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Abstract—Connected vehicles promise to enable a wide range of new
automotive services that will improve road safety, ease traffic manage-
ment, and make the overall travel experience more enjoyable. However,
they also open significant new surfaces for attacks on the electron-
ics that control most of modern vehicle operations. In particular, the
emergence of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication risks to lay fertile
ground for self-propagating mobile malware that targets automobile
environments. In this work, we perform a first study on the the dynamics
of vehicular malware epidemics in a large-scale road network, and unveil
how a reasonably fast worm can easily infect thousands of vehicles in
minutes. We determine how such dynamics are affected by a number
of parameters, including the diffusion of the vulnerability, the penetration
ratio and range of the V2V communication technology, or the worm self-
propagation mechanism. We also propose a simple yet very effective
numerical model of the worm spreading process, and prove it to be able
to mimic the results of computationally expensive network simulations.
Finally, we leverage the model to characterize the dangerousness of the
geographical location where the worm is first injected, as well as for
efficient containment of the epidemics through the cellular network.
Index Terms—Vehicular networks, V2V, mobile malware.
1 INTRODUCTION
Pervasive wireless device-to-device (D2D) communication is
regarded as a game changer that could enable a broad range of
new applications in a wide range of contexts. However, if not
properly secured, the network interfaces of smart devices can
turn into easily exploitable back-doors, allowing illegal remote
access to the information stored on the device as well as to
the local network it may be connected to. Even worse, D2D
communication can be leveraged by self-propagating malware
to reach a large number of devices and damage them, disrupt
their services or steal sensible data.
Although mobile malware first appeared a decade ago [2],
[3], [4], the low penetration of smart devices and the het-
erogeneity of their operating systems have prevented major
outbreaks to date [5]. Yet, as the diffusion of communica-
tion interfaces keeps growing and the OS market becomes
more stable, we may face smart-device worm epidemics in
the near future. In fact, the research community has started
assessing the risks associated to a large-scale diffusion of
so-called mobile worms. Simulative and experimental studies
have considered epidemics in campuses [6] or urban areas [7],
and different infection vectors, from metropolitan Wi-Fi asso-
ciations [8] to text messaging in cellular networks [9], [10].
This work is an extended version of a IEEE WoWMoM 2013 paper [1].
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A quite underrated context where mobile malware could
cause dramatic damage is the automotive one. Indeed, vehi-
cles feature today a wide range of Electronic Control Units
(ECUs) that drive most of the car automatic behaviors and
are interconnected by a Controller Area Network (CAN) bus.
Experimental tests have demonstrated that ECUs are extremely
fragile to the injection of non-compliant randommessages over
the CAN. Even worse, a knowledgeable adversary can exploit
them to bypass the driver input and take control over key
automotive functions, e.g., disabling brakes or stopping the car
engine [11]. Remote attacks on ECUs have been proved fea-
sible via the Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) [12]
or the CD player, Bluetooth and cellular interfaces [13].
In a context where awareness of the security risks associated
to connected vehicles is growing [14], [15], D2D technologies
for vehicular environments, enabling direct vehicle-to-vehicle
(V2V) communication, are nearly upon us. Regulators in the
US are already crafting a proposal enforcing all new vehicles
to embed V2V radio interfaces by early 2017 [16]. Despite
the advantages it will bring in terms of support to road safety
and traffic management services, the emergence of the V2V
paradigm risks to significantly widen the range of attack
surfaces available to vehicle-targeted mobile malware [17].
Understanding the dangers associated with a vehicular mal-
ware epidemics becomes then critical.
In this paper, we contribute to that endeavor by providing
a first comprehensive characterization of the dynamics of
a mobile worm that exploits V2V communication to self-
propagate through a large-scale road network. To that end,
after a review of the literature, in Sec. 2, we first identify
the major properties of a generic vehicular worm, in Sec. 3,
and present our reference road traffic scenarios, in Sec. 4. In
Sec. 5, we propose a data-driven numerical model of the worm
propagation process that is at a time simple and accurate. We
then unveil, in Sec. 6, the significant features of a vehicular
worm epidemics in a very large-scale environment. Sec. 7
provides an in-depth analysis of the dangerousness of worms
injected at different geographical locations, and proposes a
practical technique for the containment of worm epidemics,
which achieve a 100% healing of infected nodes while reduc-
ing patch transmissions by up to 90% with respect to a naive
approach. Finally, Sec. 8 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Despite the significant danger represented by the appearance
of mobile malware in vehicular environments, the literature
on the topic is still relatively thin. Indeed, surveys on automo-
tive security only recently started to acknowledge V2V-based
2malware as a major threat [18], [19].
In a seminal work, Khayam and Radha [20] perform a first
analytical study of vehicular worm spreading on a highway.
In order to make the model tractable, their analysis relies
on average values rather than on a complete description of
the network connectivity. Nekovee [21] remarks that such an
approach fails to capture the spatiotemporal dynamics of V2V
connectivity and overestimates the rapidity of the infection. In
order to account for the time-evolving nature of the vehicular
network, Nekovee uses a set of snapshots of the road traffic,
and simulates the diffusion of a worm in each separately.
Although he employs realistic microscopic mobility models
to derive road traffic densities, Nekovee assumes uniform
distributions of vehicles, which have later been shown not to
occur in the real world [22], [23].
Chen and Shakya [22] overcome the problem by populating
highway traffic snapshots according to inter-vehicle spacing
distributions fitted on real-world data collected by researchers
of the Berkeley Highway Laboratory. The availability of such
dual-loop detector data for different daily traffic conditions
allows to explore the impact of daytime on the worm epi-
demics. However, the lack of temporal correlation between
the snapshots does not allow to study the propagation of
worms over time; this, in turn, precludes the possibility of
leveraging the model in systems where car positions change
during the spreading process, e.g., in presence of roads longer
than a few kilometers or of worms that take more than a
few milliseconds to self-propagate. For the same reason, this
technique cannot capture diffusion through store-carry-and-
forward, where vehicles physically transport the malware until
the latter can infect other cars during occasional contacts.
Wang et al. [24] properly account for such temporal features
by leveraging tools for the simulation of both road traffic
and vehicular network operations. The approach allows to
evaluate how worm epidemics are affected by several system
parameters, i.e., the communication range, the density of
vehicles, and the medium access control mechanism. The
study by Wang et al. represents, to the best of our knowledge,
the only other work on an urban scenario: however, their road
network is modeled as a simple Voronoi tessellation, and it
covers a small surface of 1 km2 with less than 200 vehicles.
When compared to the previous works above, our study
yields the following original contributions:
• Our evaluation is carried out on a scale that is orders of
magnitude larger than those considered in the literature:
considering a 10.000 km2 region with over 3.600 km of
heterogeneous roads allows us to picture vehicular worm
epidemics with unprecedented breadth an detail;
• Our analysis is performed on different state-of-art datasets
of road traffic that yield realistic macroscopic and mi-
croscopic features: we do not thus rely on simplistic
assumptions on the features of vehicular mobility – an
approach that substantiates the reliability of our results;
• We propose an original numerical model of vehicular
worm propagation, which leverages statistical road traffic
data commonly available to transportation authorities;
the model is simple, yet it can accurately reproduce
the epidemics in realistic mobility conditions and for
the whole space of system parameters, capturing worm
diffusion via both connected multi-hop and store-carry-
and-forward paradigms.
The spreading of generic vehicular worms can also be as-
similated, to some extent, to the dissemination of information
in vehicular networks. Research activities in that context have
mainly focused on: (i) simulative analyses of the dissemina-
tion of delay-tolerant data within urban areas; (ii) analytical
modeling of epidemic dissemination in highway environments.
As far as the first category is concerned, efficient protocols
such as MDDV [25] and VADD [26], just to cite a couple
of well-known approaches, are built around complex decision
algorithms that minimize the communication overhead while
preserving high packet delivery ratios and low delays. These
works are thus different in spirit from ours, where worms
propagate in a completely uncontrolled fashion, and without
any concern on the overhead they generate. Such epidemic
dissemination in urban vehicular networks has been also
studied [27], although in scenarios spanning a few tens of km2,
and without proposing an actual modeling of the phenomenon.
Also when confronted to the second type of works, all of
our major contributions listed above still hold. In addition,
epidemic dissemination models typically build on strong as-
sumptions on, e.g., deterministic [28] and exponential [29],
[30] inter-vehicle spacing distributions, or on independently
distributed speeds of vehicles [31], [32]. As already discussed,
our study is instead based on realistic road traffic datasets.
Finally, as we deal with malware rather than normal content,
we address aspects – such as the worm containment or the
level of danger associated to geographical locations – that are
not considered in epidemic dissemination.
3 MOBILE WORMS IN VEHICULAR NETWORKS
Worms are programs that self-propagate across a communica-
tion network through security flaws common to large groups of
network nodes; they are thus different from computer viruses
in that the latter need the intervention of the user to propagate.
Worms can be classified on the basis of several factors [33]:
the target discovery, i.e., the way they discover targets to
propagate to; the carrier, i.e., the infection mechanism used
for the self-propagation; the activation, i.e., the technique by
which the worm code starts its activity on the infected host;
the payload, i.e., the set of routines undertaken by the worm,
that clearly depend on the nature and objective of the attacker.
Our interest is on the worm epidemics within the vehicular
network. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the first two
aspects above, the type of target discovery and the kind of
carrier employed by the worm, as they mainly drive the mal-
ware self-propagation process. Our study is instead activation-
and payload-independent, since we do not delve into the kind
of damage caused by the worm nor the motivation behind
the attacks – although the discussion in Sec. 1 hints at how
dangerous the outcome could be.
In the remainder of this section, we will characterize ve-
hicular worms in terms of their target discovery and carrier
features. We will also introduce the overall worm infection
process which we will assume in our study.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the node degree in the vehicular
network of the Canton of Zurich dataset.
3.1 Target discovery
The target discovery of a worm within a vehicular network is
dictated by the dynamics of road traffic. As a matter of fact,
the relatively short range of V2V communication limits the set
of potential worm targets to cars in geographic proximity of
the one the worm resides in. Thus, it is the physical mobility
of cars that allows the worm to enlarge its target set, by
exploiting links established between communication-enabled
vehicles that come into contact during their trips.
Such a mobility-driven geographic target discovery occurs
in a way that significantly differs from that of standard Internet
worms, which have to perform global or local scans for IP
addresses to infect. In vehicular networks, the target discovery
is implicitly (and involuntarily) supported by the forthcoming
V2V communication standards, that mandate the periodic
broadcast of beacon messages by all vehicles and with high
(1 to 10 Hz typically) frequency: this is the case of, e.g.,
SAE J2735 heartbeats (part of the WAVE stack) and ETSI
ITS Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs). A worm could
then simply leverage the information collected by the vehicle
via these messages in order to determine its current target set.
3.2 Carrier
As far as the carrier is concerned, two mechanisms are
possible. In the first case, the worm can self-propagate through
broadcast messages, infecting all of its neighbors at once. We
refer to this mechanism as the broadcast carrier. In the second
case, the worm can only propagate to one neighboring vehicle
at a time, which we tag as unicast carrier. We argue that,
in the case of a unicast carrier, no real decision has to be
taken on which communication neighbor to attack: unlike what
happens in the Internet, where the choice is between hundreds
of millions of machines, the number of cars concurrently in
range of a worm is generally low. As an example, in the large-
scale road traffic scenario we will detail in the next section
and consider in our analysis, the distribution of the number of
one-hop neighbors (i.e., the vehicular network node degree)
follows Fig. 1. The degree ranges from a few units to a few
tens of vehicles at most, and a car typically has less than 10
neighbors half of time. Such a small target set size makes a
selection of the target node subset pointless, and worms can
randomly pick the neighbor car to infect next.
The carrier is also characterized by a second aspect, i.e., the
number of transmissions (either broadcast or unicast) required
to complete the infection. This value depends on the size of
the worm (in KB) and on the way it is hidden into messages.
(a) Canton of Zurich, road map (b) Madrid, highway segment locations
Fig. 2. (a) Road network layout in the Canton of Zurich
dataset, scaled at 1:2.700.000. (b) Geographical location
of the highway segments in the Madrid dataset.
We translate this aspect into a second parameter, the carrier
latency τ , i.e., the amount of time a worm needs to self-
propagate to all (broadcast carrier case) or one (unicast carrier
case) of its neighbors. Thus, τ also accounts for all delays
possibly incurred in at different layers of the stack: e.g.,
association and session establishment procedures, wireless
channel contention or lost message retransmissions.
3.3 Worm infection process
Borrowing the terminology from epidemiology, we adopt in
our study a Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR) model
with Immunization. According to this model, a clean node is
susceptible to become infected by the worm, but it is healed if
it receives a dedicated cure, i.e., a patch, that prevents it from
contracting the infection again. The same cure can be delivered
even to a susceptible node, which is then immunized, i.e., it
cannot be infected by the worm1. We also denote the first
infected vehicle as patient zero, and the location and time at
which it was first infected as the origin of the worm infection.
The population affected by the SIR model with Immuniza-
tion is formed by all communication-enabled vehicles that
circulate in the geographical area of interest, and suffer from
the security flaw exploited by the worm to propagate. We
characterize such a fraction of vehicles through the penetration
ratio ρ, which thus accounts for the diffusion of both the
vehicular communication technology and the security flaw.
4 REFERENCE SCENARIOS
We employ two types of road traffic datasets in our study. The
first is a large-scale representation of vehicular mobility within
the Canton of Zurich, in Switzerland. We employ this dataset
as our reference scenario for the investigation of malware
epidemics over a wide geographical region. The second is a set
of accurate descriptions of highway traffic along two segments
of the beltway surrounding Madrid, Spain. We leverage this
1. We favor a SIR model over other common models, such as Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible (SIS), as we believe that it better fits the threat use case
we consider. Indeed, we assume the mobile worm to self-propagate among
connected vehicles without human intervention. The worm thus exploits
some backdoor or software vulnerability to infect a new vehicle, rather than
thoughtless actions by a human actor. Hence, a patch that solves the software
flaw can prevent further infections by the same mobile worm.
4latter dataset for the fine-grained calibration and validation of
our numerical model of the vehicular worm propagation.
Both datasets are synthetic, yet they faithfully mimic the
features of real-world road traffic. Below, we present the two
datasets, and motivate their choice for the purpose of our study.
4.1 Canton of Zurich dataset
Our reference scenario encompasses the whole Canton of
Zurich, an area of 10.000 km2 in Switzerland. The region,
whose 3.683-km road layout is portrayed in Fig. 2(a), com-
prises the urban and suburban neighborhoods of Zurich, sev-
eral smaller towns nearby, as well as the highways, freeways
and minor regional roadways interconnecting them. The syn-
thetic mobility of vehicles in the area has been generated
by means of the multi-agent microscopic traffic simulator
(MMTS) developed at ETH Zurich. The MMTS queuing-
based mesoscopic modeling approach has been proven to
reproduce real-world large-scale traffic flow dynamics and
small-scale car-to-car interactions [34].
The choice of this dataset for our large-scale study of
vehicular worm epidemics is an unescapable one. Indeed, no
other synthetic or real-world mobility dataset that is publicly
available covers today a similarly wide region in a comparable
realistic manner. Other synthetic datasets may feature higher
microscopic detail [35], [36], however they cover geographical
areas that are two orders of magnitude smaller than that
included in the Canton of Zurich dataset. Even real-world
data on vehicular mobility, logged from taxis [37], [38] or
buses [39], cannot compete in terms of spatial coverage;
moreover, such data is only representative of a limited subset
of road traffic. Overall, using alternate datasets would signifi-
cantly limit the scope and interest of our analysis.
4.2 Madrid dataset
The Madrid dataset comprises 16 traces of road traffic on
two highway segments in proximity of Madrid, Spain. The
geographical locations of the two highways are portrayed in
Fig. 2(b): the left marker pinpoints a segment of the A6 motor-
way that connects A Corun˜a to Madrid, the right one identifies
a segment of the M40 that runs around the conurbation. The
traces represent vehicular mobility on each highway segment
at rush (8 am) and off-peak (11 am) hours on four working
days. The traces were generated by feeding fine-grained real-
world traffic counts to a microscopic simulator implementing
well-known car-following and lane-changing models. They
feature free-flow traffic in quasi-stationary conditions [40].
The Madrid dataset is the most realistic description of
road traffic on individual highway segments that is publicly
available to date. It thus represents the sensible choice for the
calibration and validation of our numerical model of the worm
propagation speed along single road segments, in Sec. 5.2.
5 MODELING THE WORM EPIDEMICS
The computer simulation of worm epidemics in the large-scale
scenario presented in Sec. 4.1 is computationally expensive.
The span of the road topology – where up to 36.000 vehicles
travel concurrently for a time span of several hours – prevents
the use of traditional network simulators, such as ns-3 or
OMNeT++. Instead, we developed a dedicated simulator2 that
abstracts the detailed processing of messages through the
network protocol stack, and adopts a simple R-radius disc
modeling of the radio-frequency signal propagation. Unless
stated otherwise, we will consider a default V2V communi-
cation range R = 100 m. This represents an average value
among those identified for reliable packet delivery by different
experimental studies on DSRC-based transfers [41], [42].
Such a design makes simulations of very large-scale vehic-
ular networks more bearable. In Sec. 6, we will leverage sim-
ulations to provide first qualitative insights into the epidemics
dynamics, in presence of different carrier types, penetration
ratios, V2V communication ranges and infection origins.
However, even such a scalable simulation approach remains
limited by its computational cost, which does not allow to
perform comprehensive, quantitative analyses. To overcome
this issue, we propose a numerical model capable of faithfully
mimicking the vehicular worm epidemics. Our broadcast-
carrier worm propagation model is data-driven, in that it is
based on commonly available road traffic statistics. Although
simple in its expression, the model can capture the impact
of a number of system parameters on the large-scale worm
propagation delay, at a computational cost that is orders of
magnitude lower than that of a simulative evaluation. We
devote this section to the description and validation of the
model, which we will later exploit in Sec. 7 to carry out
extensive studies that are not feasible via simulation.
5.1 Preliminaries
Most existing analytical models of information propagation
along road segments build on strong assumptions on the
nature of vehicle inter-arrivals, so as to make the problem
mathematically tractable. As discussed in Sec. 2, many such
models presume, e.g., deterministic or Poisson arrivals. How-
ever, measurements on real-world arterial roads have shown
that actual vehicular inter-arrival times follow a more complex
normal-exponential mixture distribution [23], i.e.,
fT (t) = wN
1√
2piσ2
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 + wEλe
−λ(t−t0), (1)
where µ, σ, λ and t0 are the parameters of the normal and
exponential components, respectively, whereas wN and wE are
their associated weights. Clearly, the discrepancy between the
assumed and actual arrival distributions questions the validity
of many models proposed in the literature.
Instead, our model does not require any assumption on
the distribution of vehicle inter-spacing, speed or inter-arrival
time. As we will later detail, the model operates on averages
only, which makes it independent of higher order statistics
and capable of accommodating any distribution. This notwith-
standing, we make sure that our model is evaluated under
inter-arrival settings that faithfully mimic those encountered
in the real world. Specifically, we verified that the reference
2. URL: http://people.ac.upc.edu/trullols/downloads.html.
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Fig. 3. Inter-arrival time distributions. (a) Canton of Zurich. (b,c,d,e) Madrid highways at different days and hours.
scenarios used in our study and introduced in Sec. 4 yield inter-
arrival distributions that match the normal-exponential mixture
identified by empirical measurements. Fig. 3 portrays the inter-
arrival distributions observed in the Canton of Zurich dataset
and in four Madrid traces: in all cases, the synthetic road traffic
data follow the mixture theoretical distribution in (1).
The numerical model we propose builds on (i) information
about the road topology and (ii) statistical information about
the road traffic. In the first category, we need, for each road
segment3 i, knowledge of its length li and a list of the other
roads it intersects with: this data can be easily extracted from
accurate road mapping services such as, e.g., OpenStreetMap.
As for the second category, the model requires information on
the average travel speed vi(t) on road segment i at time t, and
on the mean inter-arrival time ai(t) of vehicles at road segment
i at time t. Such road traffic metrics are typically collected
by transportation authorities and automobile service providers
through induction loops, infra-red counters, traffic monitoring
cameras, and, more recently, floating car data [43]. Therefore,
historical or statistical data on measures such as vi(t) and ai(t)
is available for large portions of the road topology, and its
public disclosure is growing, fostered by open data initiatives.
As road traffic information is, by its own nature, time-
varying, the average speed and inter-arrival time are not the
same over the day or on different days of the week, which is
why we consider vi(t) and ai(t) to be dependent on time. The
aforementioned historical or statistical data already reflects this
aspect, with finite yet representative time granularity4. We also
remark that, although higher order statistics may be available
to transportation authorities or automobile service providers,
our model only requires knowledge of the mean values of
vi(t) and ai(t) during each time period. This keeps the model
simple and computationally efficient, at the same time avoiding
to raise privacy or security issues related to the disclosure of
exceedingly detailed data about road traffic dynamics.
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss how the
aforementioned information is leveraged to build our model,
following the notation summarized in Tab. 1. Specifically, in
Sec. 5.2, we will present a model of the worm propagation
speed along a single road segment. Then, in Sec. 5.3 we will
extend the result to a network-wide infection process.
3. The model can accommodate any definition of road segment, and can
adapt to the detail level of available road traffic statistics. In our study, we map
road segments to (i) segments between any two intersections in the Canton
of Zurich scenario, and (ii) 10-km highway stretches in the Madrid dataset.
4. In our evaluation, we assume that statistical data on the road traffic
is aggregated and updated with a time granularity of 15 minutes, largely
sufficient to capture the temporal variability of road traffic.
TABLE 1
Summary of notation.
τ Carrier latency – amount of time a worm needs to self-propagate
ρ Penetration ratio – fraction of communicating vehicles susceptible of infection
R Communication range – maximum distance for two vehicles to communicate
vi Average traval speed on road i
ai Average inter-arrival time on road i
5.2 Per-road segment worm propagation
Our goal is initially to model the worm propagation speed
si(t) along a segment i at time t, characterized by average
road traffic parameters vi(t) and ai(t), while accounting for
R, ρ and τ . For the sake of clarity, in the following we will
refer to a generic time instant and drop the time notation.
We start from the consideration that the worm propa-
gation speed mainly depends on the network connectivity
level. Namely, the malware can propagate wirelessly, and
thus at a high speed, in a well-connected vehicular network
where multi-hop communication can take place. Conversely,
the worm propagation is slowed down when communication
opportunities are scarce. Focusing on the two extreme cases,
we can state that: (i) in complete absence of vehicle-to-vehicle
connectivity, the worm propagates at the vehicular speed vi,
as it is physically carried by isolated cars; (ii) in presence of a
complete road coverage by a very dense multi-hop vehicular
network, the worm proceeds by jumps of distance equal to the
communication rangeR, each needing a time τ (i.e., the carrier
latency) to complete, during which the worm still moves at
speed vi. Thus, the worm propagation speed can be written as
si = vi +
R
τ
f(ai, vi, ρ, R, τ) , (2)
where f(·) is a function that describes how the vehicular net-
work connectivity depends on the different system parameters.
The function returns values between 0 (complete absence of
connectivity, all vehicles are isolated) and 1 (fully connected
network, any pair of cars is connected via a multi-hop path).
In order to characterize the exact expression of f(·), we
consider the impact of the different parameters on the network
connectivity. Let us start from the simplified case of vehicles
moving along the same road direction. In that case, the
average distance between two subsequent vehicles is given by
ai ·vi, i.e., the distance traveled by the first vehicle before the
following one enters the same road. The penetration ratio can
be accounted for by assuming that the first vehicle is equipped
with a V2V radio interface and vulnerable to the worm, and
ρ can be seen as the probability that the following vehicle
6aivi/ρ
first vulnerable vehicle
next vulnerable vehicle
(b) (a)
deviation mean
distance
deviation
(< aivi/ρ)
R
(> aivi/ρ)
Fig. 4. Example of the negative impact on network con-
nectivity of the deviation of an individual vehicle speed
and inter-arrival time from the mean values vi and ai.
is communication-enabled and vulnerable as well. Then, an
average of 1/ρ vehicles must enter the road before a second
car susceptible of being infected appears on the same road.
The average distance between to vehicles that can be involved
in the epidemics is then aivi
ρ
.
The connectivity is determined by the relationship between
the distance above and the transmission range R. In particular,
it is the ratio between the two values, aivi
ρR
, that matters: the
lower the ratio, the higher the network connectivity, and vice-
versa. In fact, it is to be noted that those above are all average
values, and that some variability is natural in both the inter-
arrival time and speed of individual vehicles. As shown in
Fig. 4, the actual distance between vulnerable vehicles can
be lower (case (a), next vehicle shifted towards the first) or
higher (case (b), next vehicle shifted away from the first) than
the mean aivi
ρ
. The key remark here is that the two effects
do not compensate for each other. On the one hand, distances
shorter than the mean (case (a) in Fig. 4) do not improve the
connectivity, as the individual vehicles were already within
range when traveling at the mean speed and separated by the
mean inter-arrival time. On the other hand, distances larger
than the mean (case (b) in Fig. 4) can disrupt the link between
two subsequent vulnerable vehicles, by creating a gap larger
than R between them. As a result, the intrinsic variability of
the road traffic metrics can only have a negative impact on the
network connectivity, and considering average values means to
overestimate the availability of V2V communication. A simple
approach to address this issue is to introduce a factor K ≥ 1
that reduces the propagation opportunities by multiplying the
previous expression, which results5 in a term Kaivi
ρR
.
Recall that the discussion above refers however to the case
where vehicles all move in the same direction. The presence
of an opposite vehicular flow can be accounted in a rough
(yet effective, as we will show next) way, by considering ai
to be the average inter-arrival of vehicles at both ends of the
bi-directional road segment. Finally, the carrier latency τ , as
an application-level parameter, has no major impact6 on the
network connectivity expressed by f(·). In summary
si = vi +
R
τ
f
(
K ai vi
ρ R
)
. (3)
We still have to identify a proper expression for the function
5. As discussed later, we found K to be invariant to road traffic and
communication settings, and we thus treat it as a constant in the following.
6. The only case where τ can indirectly affect the network connectivity is
that of a carrier latency so large to be comparable to the time required to
travel a whole road segment between two intersections. However, the latter is
at least several tens of seconds, while τ is expected to be much shorter.
f(·) and a value for the parameter K . To that end, we employ
the realistic dataset of road traffic on highways segments
around Madrid that we presented in Sec. 4. By fitting the ex-
pression in (3) to network simulations of the worm propagation
in such mobility datasets, we observed that a single function
f(x) = exp(−x2) and a single value K = 3 fit the data for any
combination of road traffic and communication parameters.
The worm propagation speed along segment i is then
si = vi +
R
τ
exp
[
−
(
3 ai vi
ρ R
)2]
. (4)
This single, simple expression can be employed to describe the
average worm propagation speed along a road segment, given
that its road traffic statistics, i.e., the average vehicular speed
vi and the average inter-arrival time ai, are known. We remark
that the exponential shape of f(·) and the rather high value
of K make connectivity decrease very rapidly. E.g., when
the average distance between two vehicles involved in the
epidemics is half of the communication range, i.e., αivi
ρi
= R2 ,
there is only a 10% probability that the worm can successfully
propagate between the two.
We validate the per-road segment propagation model in (4)
by assessing its capability of matching simulation results under
the whole space of combinations of the system parameters
R, ρ and τ . Fig. 5 compares the propagation speed si com-
puted with the model in (4) against that obtained by running
simulations on the Madrid highway datasets. We can observe
that the model is consistently in good agreement with the
simulation outcome, when varying any of R, τ , and ρ over
their significant value ranges along the x axis. Moreover, we
found this result to hold for any combination of highway
segment, day time and weekday. in the Madrid dataset.
We also tested the model in (4) against simulations of the
infection propagation along individual road segments of the
Canton of Zurich scenario. We found again a good agreement
between the model and the simulation, in Fig. 6. There, the
plots marked as (a), (b) and (c) aggregate the results for all
road segments that feature similar average vehicular speeds,
ranging between 11 m/s (less than 40 km/h) and 28 m/s
(over 100 km/h). Each plot displays a scatterplot of the worm
propagation speed measured at each segment i, versus the road
average inter-arrival time, ai, with baseline parameters R =
100m, τ = 1 s ρ = 1. The red curve represents the average
behavior observed in simulation on all roads, while the black
curve is the result provided by our model. The plots marked
as (d), (e) and (f) show instead the worm propagation speed
for different values of R, τ and ρ, respectively. There, for the
sake of clarity, the scattered simulation samples are not shown
and only the average curves, in red, are reported.
Overall, the results in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show that our data-
driven model can faithfully mimic the average behavior of the
worm propagation speed, under any road traffic condition, in
both the Madrid and Canton of Zurich scenarios. Of course,
the model does not capture the random variability around the
mean that is observed for specific roads. This is due to the
fact that we only consider the average values of vi and ai in
our study, and not higher-order moments of their distributions.
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Fig. 5. Model validation. Per-road segment worm propagation speed in the Madrid highway datasets, from network
simulations (dots) and as predicted by the proposed model (line), versus R (four leftmost plots), τ (four middle plots),
and ρ (four rightmost plots). For each parameter, the four plots refer to a highway segment and day-time pair. Each
plot gathers data from four weekdays yielding similar road traffic conditions (i.e., average speed and inter-arrival time).
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Fig. 6. Model validation. Per-road segment worm propa-
gation speed versus the average inter-arrival time ai in
the Canton of Zurich dataset. Simulations, on individual
roads (dots) and on average (red thin line), are compared
to the proposed model (black thick line). Roads yielding
similar average speed si are aggregated in plots (a,b,c).
System parameters R, τ , and ρ are varied in plots (d,e,f).
This is an intentional choice that allows us to keep the model
simple, and yet to obtain excellent results when considering
the network-wide infection, as discussed next.
5.3 Road network-wide worm propagation
The per-road segment worm propagation speed expression in
(4) can be leveraged to describe the propagation process over
the whole road network. In particular, the road network-wide
infection is completely described by the spread delay, i.e., the
time that a worm takes to reach a specific location after the
appearance of patient zero at the origin.
In order to translate the per-road segment propagation into
the network-wide spread delay, let us represent the road layout
as a graphG=(V , E), where the set of vertices V represents the
intersections and the set of edges E represents the roads joining
such intersections. Knowing the worm propagation speed si
along a road segment i, as well as the length of such segment
li, the spread delay from one end of the road to the other is
immediately derived as wi=
li
si
. Each edge in E can then be
associated to a weight corresponding to its spread delay wi.
Note that the resulting weighted graph is time-varying, since
the worm propagation speeds along each road change over
time, and so do the weights derived from them.
Given the infection time t and the location on the road
topology of patient zero, calculating the spread delay from
the origin point to any other point of the region reduces to
a single-source shortest path problem on the weighted graph
associated to time t. A standard Dijkstra’s algorithm can be
used to efficiently solve the problem. The spread delay to a
given location on the road network maps to the cost of the
shortest path to its corresponding vertex or edge on the graph,
or, in other words, to the sum of the spread delays along the
fastest path from the infection origin to the given location.
An intuitive representation of the model accuracy is pro-
vided in Fig. 7. The plots depict the geographical spread of a
worm originating in downtown Zurich at 3 pm, as occurring
in simulation and as predicted by the model. The red dots
represent the locations that are reached by both approaches at
fixed times after the worm injection. Filled circles are used to
denote locations reached in simulation only, and empty circles
those reached by the model only. We can note that the worm
propagation is almost identical in the two cases, as most of the
reached points are covered at the same time by the simulation
and the model. The differences, i.e., the points that are reached
at each time instant by the simulation or by the model only, are
few and always limited to the rim of the propagation process.
The spread delay for the epidemic process in Fig. 7 can
be summarized in a plot such as that of Fig. 8(a). The
plot portrays the road network-wide spread delay measured
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Fig. 7. Model validation. Geographical spread of the worm over the Canton of Zurich road network and at different
time instants, in simulation (red dots and •) and in the proposed model (red dots and ◦) with R = 100 m, τ = 1 s, ρ = 1.
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Fig. 8. Model validation. Road network-wide spread delay with (a) default settings, varying (b,c) R, (d,e) τ , (f,g) ρ.
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Fig. 9. Average error versus carrier communication range R (left), latency τ (middle) and penetration ratio ρ (right).
in simulation (dots), and that derived with our data-driven
model (solid line). Graph vertices (i.e., road intersections) are
ranked along the x axis according to the worm spread delay
determined by the model. Therefore, by fixing a specific time
instant along the y axis (e.g., 8 minutes in Fig. 8(a)), the
plane is split into four regions. Dots in each region map to
intersections that, 8 minutes after worm injection, are reached
by infection (i) in both simulation and model, (ii) in simulation
only, (iii) in model only, and (iv) in none of the two.
Clearly, it is desirable that the model solid line in Fig. 8(a)
fits well the dots obtained in simulation. This is the case, as
the deviation of the individual dots from the line is limited –
which translates into the minor errors at the rim of the infection
observed in Fig. 7. We remark that Fig. 8(a) refers to the case
of R = 100m, τ = 1 s, ρ = 1. However, the quality of the
result is the same when the systems parameters R, τ , and ρ
are varied, as shown in the other plots of Fig. 8.
Finally, a comprehensive picture of the model reliability
in terms of road network-wide spread delay is provided in
Fig. 9. The three plots show the average error, in minutes,
between the simulation results and the model outcome for the
whole parameter space. Notably, the error is always positive,
i.e., the model always overestimate the speed of the infection.
However, the error stays below 2 minutes for most of the
combinations of R, τ and ρ, and is often at or below 1 minute.
6 UNDERSTANDING THE EPIDEMICS
As a first step in the characterization of worm epidemics
in large-scale vehicular networks, we aim at understanding
the main features of the infection propagation, as well as
the impact that the different system parameters have on it.
To that end, we run a comprehensive simulation campaign
in the Canton of Zurich scenario presented in Sec. 4.1. At
this time, our focus is on on the worm infection propagation
process in the vehicular environment. Thus, we do not consider
patching as an option to recover or immunize the vehicles.
In epidemiology, this is equivalent to consider a Susceptible,
Infected (SI) model. We will study malware patching and the
complete SIR with Immunization, in Sec. 7.
6.1 Worm carrier
We start by studying the impact of the worm carrier. Let us for
now assume that patient zero appears in downtown Zurich, i.e.,
at the center of the map in Fig. 2(a) approximately, at 3 pm,
when the road traffic intensity is at its peak. In Fig. 10(a), we
focus on the carrier mechanism, setting the carrier latency τ =
1 s and comparing the results achieved by a broadcast carrier
against those obtained by a unicast carrier. The reach of the
epidemics is measured in terms of the infection ratio, i.e., the
fraction of vulnerable vehicles that the worm has reached four
hours after the injection time7. The x axis reports the combined
V2V technology and security flaw penetration ratio ρ, growing
from 1% to 100% of the vehicles.
We observe that a broadcast carrier achieves a higher
infection ratio than a unicast one. This is expected, since the
latter mechanism requires the worm to carry out multiple self-
propagations, each taking a time τ , to reach all the nodes
that a broadcast-carrier worm can infect with a single self-
propagation in a time τ . However, the difference is marginal
7. As we will later see, such a timespan is largely sufficient for this analysis.
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Fig. 11. Infection ratio versus time, for different penetration ratios ρ and latencies τ , in presence of a broadcast carrier.
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0
In
fe
ct
io
n 
ra
tio
Penetration ratio, ρ
Broadcast carrier
Unicast carrier
(a) Carrier mechanism
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.01 0.05 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0
In
fe
ct
io
n 
ra
tio
Penetration rate, ρ
τ = 0s    
τ = 0.2s
τ = 1s    
τ = 5s
τ = 10s
τ = 20s
(b) Carrier latency, τ .
Fig. 10. Infection ratio versus the penetration ratio ρ, in
presence of different worm carrier features. Error bars
represent the standard deviation. (a) Broadcast or unicast
carrier. (b) Carrier latency. Figure best viewed in color.
at very low penetration ratios, and the two carrier mechanisms
perform basically the same once 5% or more of the vehicles
are susceptible of contracting the worm.
As far as the impact of ρ is concerned, higher penetration
ratios clearly lead to a more connected network of vulnerable
vehicles, which in turn facilitates the spreading of the worm.
A value of ρ = 0.3, mapping to 30% of communication-
enabled vehicles, is already sufficient for the worm to achieve
a complete infection of the vehicular network. However, it is
surprising to note that very high infection ratios, well above
0.7, are achieved even in very sparse networks comprising
1% of the cars, and that 90% of the network is reached by
the worm when just 5% of the vehicles are vulnerable. This
susceptivity of vehicular environments to worm epidemics
is imputable to the fact that the high velocity of cars can
compensate for the reduced penetration ratio, generating many
V2V contacts and facilitating the worm self-propagation in a
store-carry-and-forward fashion.
In Fig. 10(b), we focus on the broadcast carrier case and
study the impact of the carrier latency τ , in presence of
different penetration ratios. More precisely, we consider a τ
ranging from 0 s (which represents an ideal upper bound to
the worm spreading performance, since the worm infection
is instantaneous) to 20 s. We observe that, even in presence
of low penetration ratios, a sufficiently fast worm (i.e., one
capable of self-propagating to its 1-hop neighborhood in one
second or less) can successfully infect the vast majority of the
vehicles in a very large region such as the one we considered.
In fact, when τ ≤ 1 s, at least 85% of the vehicles are infected
under any penetration ratio. Longer carrier latencies appear
instead to be more dependent on ρ: when τ ≥ 10 s the worm
is unable of spreading throughout the whole network even if
all the vehicles are susceptible of being infected.
The results above let us conclude that: (i) unicast-carrier
worm are as dangerous as broadcast-carrier ones; (ii) a low
percentage of vulnerable vehicles is sufficient for worms to
spread over a large area, due to the fast dynamics of road
traffic that facilitate malware propagation; (iii) worms do not
need to be extremely fast in infecting neighboring vehicles, as
a 1-second carrier delay8 is largely sufficient to vehiculate the
worm to the whole network in all conditions.
6.2 Worm epidemics over time and survivability
The percentages of infected nodes presented before are com-
puted at some fixed temporal deadline. Now, we consider the
temporal dynamics of the infection propagation. Specifically,
we focus on: (i) the time needed for the worm to reach a given
infection ratio within the vehicular network; (ii) the so-called
worm survivability, defined as the period of time during which
the infection can persist in the vehicular network.
6.2.1 Results
In Fig. 11, each plot refers to a specific penetration ratio ρ, and
portrays the temporal evolution of the infection for different
values of the carrier latency τ . When ρ = 0.01, in Fig. 11(a),
only rapid malware with carrier latencies τ of 1 s or less can
propagate through most (although not all) of the network.
The bell-shaped infection ratio for τ = 5 s is explained by
the aggregated road traffic volume, also depicted in the figure
as the thick solid orange line: the worm is not fast enough to
infect the whole network before the traffic peak ends, at around
4.30 pm, i.e., 1 hour 30 minutes after the infection started.
As a result, the infection stays limited to the surroundings of
the injection area, and then dies out when the traffic becomes
sparser due to vehicles leaving the area or concluding their
trips. Slower worms do not even start to spread in the system.
Increasing ρ to 0.05, in Fig. 11(b), also allows slightly slower
worms, characterized by a τ in the order of a few seconds, to
infect an even larger majority of the vehicles. Namely, worms
with τ ≤ 5 s perform similarly and achieve a 95% infection
ratio with a linear growth during the first 45 minutes from
the worm injection. This clearly makes such worms extremely
dangerous, since, in order to be effective, a patch should be
provided to network nodes within a very few minutes after the
worm injection. The bell shape now characterizes the diffusion
8. We remark that 1 s is a perfectly realistic value for the carrier latency,
considering that worms consists in a few tens of KB of code and that the
V2V base data transmission rate is in the order of a few Mbps.
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Fig. 12. (a) Infection ratio versus time, for different carrier
mechanisms and penetration ratios ρ. (b) V2V contact
duration distribution in the Canton of Zurich scenario.
of malware with a carrier latency of 10 s, for the same reasons
discussed above. Slower worms find it still difficult to spread
at such a low ρ.
A larger participation of 10% of the cars in the network, in
Fig. 11(c), does not affect the behavior of worms characterized
by a τ ≤ 5 s, and only slightly favors slower worms. On the
other hand, as the population of susceptible vehicles grows
to 50% of the overall road traffic, in Fig. 11(d), we remark
two effects. First, the infection evolutions of the faster worms
start to separate. This effect is highlighted in the inset plot,
which details the spreading process during the first 30 minutes
from the worm injection time. Indeed, very fast worms (i.e.,
with τ < 1 s) were previously limited by the lack of multi-hop
connectivity, and had to rely on carry-and-forward to find new
susceptible vehicles. As a result, their performance, hitting the
bar imposed by the limited network connectivity, was similar
to that of slower worms (e.g., with τ = 5 s). Now, fast malware
can take advantage of the presence of larger connected clusters
of vehicles, and spread over 95% of the network in some 20
minutes. Moreover, the growth is now faster than linear, with
50% of the nodes being infected in less than 6 minutes. As
a second remark, the higher penetration ratio has a largely
beneficial effect on the spread dynamics of slower worms, as
now even the curves for τ ≥ 10 s depict the infection of very
wide portions of the network. However, the worm still does
not self-sustain in those conditions, since its infection ratio
tends to drop once the road traffic peak ends.
In Fig. 11(e) we consider the case where all the vehicles
are communication-enabled, i.e., the best possible network
connectivity scenario. The effects already observed in the
previous plot are exacerbated, as the faster worms infect 50%
of the network in less than 2 minutes and spread over 95% of
nodes in 10 minutes. Slower worms also take advantage of the
increased connectivity, although they do not achieve complete
infection (τ = 5 s) or even self-sustainability (τ ≥ 10 s).
A similar temporal analysis can be done when comparing
different carrier mechanisms. Fig. 12(a) depicts the infection
evolution of broadcast and unicast worms, in presence of
varying penetration ratios, when τ = 1 s. The inset plot shows
again the detail of the first thirty minutes of the spreading
process. We can note that, although they attained a similar
final infection ratio in Fig. 10(a), unicast and broadcast car-
riers differ in terms of delay. In fact, the difference is only
remarkable at high penetration ratios, when ρ = 0.5 or 1. As the
penetration ratio decreases, the difference in the time needed to
infect the network becomes negligible, and the two paradigms
match when 10% or less of the cars are involved.
6.2.2 Carrier latency and contact time
The previous results show a striking difference in the spread
process of worms characterized by various carrier latencies.
In particular, values of τ of 1 s or less seem to result in high
infection ratios no matter the number of vehicles involved in
the network; moreover, such values of τ allow the infection
to occur much faster as the penetration ratio increases. On
the other hand, worms with a τ ≥ 10 s need high penetration
ratios to propagate and take a lot of time in doing so. Values
of τ in between those result in intermediate behaviors.
The physical reason behind this diversity lies in the V2V
contact duration distribution, shown in Fig. 12(b). There, we
can observe that most contacts among moving vehicles are
extremely short-lived: more than 70% last less than 5 seconds,
and less than 10% are longer than 10 seconds. Indeed, the
vast majority of links is established by high-speed vehicles
moving in opposing directions along highways in the Canton
of Zurich scenario: these links last just a few seconds and
dominate the network connectivity dynamics. We can remark
that relatively long-lived contacts are also present, but they
decay exponentially fast as per the inset plot in Fig. 12(b). As
a result, only 5% of the links last one minute or more, making
their contribution to the overall vehicular network connectivity
of lesser importance with respect to short contacts.
Our conclusion is that fast worms, capable to spread from
one vehicle to another in one second or less, can exploit
any contact occurring in the network. Conversely, a worm
characterized by a τ of 5 s will be only able to leverage 20%
of the contacts, and one with τ = 10 s will propagate through a
mere 8% of the actual V2V links. In other words, fast worms
enjoy a more connected network to spread through.
6.3 Infection origin
The previous results all refer to the case where the worm is
injected in the center of the geographical region we consider,
which corresponds to the urban area of Zurich. Moreover,
we considered the the infection start at the beginning of
the afternoon traffic peak, occurring at 3 pm. Given the fast
spatiotemporal dynamics of road traffic, the origin of the
infection is a critical aspect to be taken into account. Here,
we study the impact that the location and hour at which the
worm is first injected in the vehicular network have on the
infection propagation.
6.3.1 Patient zero location
We first vary the worm origin area, by considering five
different possibilities. Other than at the city of Zurich, i.e.,
our default setting, we analyze infections starting at the North,
West, South and East boundaries of the 10.000-km2 simulated
region. More precisely, as plotted in Fig. 13(a), we identify
one circular area for each origin location and pick, at each
simulation run, one vehicle in that area as our patient zero.
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Fig. 14. Infection origin. (a,b,c) Infection ratio versus time, for different patient zero locations and penetration ratios ρ.
(d) Infection ratio versus time, for different worm injection times and penetration ratios ρ.
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Fig. 13. Infection origin. (a) Map of the possible patient
zero locations. (b) Infection ratio versus the penetration
ratio ρ, for each patient zero location in the map.
The overall infection ratio recorded for each origin location,
under different penetration ratios, is shown in Fig. 13(b).
Clearly, the position of the worm injection plays a major
role in the success of the spreading: placing patient zero in
the West or East areas yields an infection ratio comparable,
and at times even better, than that achieved in the Center
case. Conversely, worms starting from the North area seem
to be slightly penalized, and those injected in the South area
consistently lag behind the other cases.
The explanation to such a result lies in the heterogeneity
of the road topology, composed of highways, major arterial
and minor urban or suburban roads, that are characterized by
diverse car traffic densities. This can be observed in Fig. 13(a),
where roads are colored according to the daily traffic volume
they carry: darker roads are more trafficked, while a very
few vehicles travel over roads that are almost white, and thus
hardly visible in the plot. The resulting map outlines how most
of the vehicles travel in or around the city of Zurich, but also
that the West and East areas are traversed by major highways.
The North area is also touched, although in a smaller measure,
by heavy-traffic arteries, whereas the South area appears only
characterized by low-traffic roads. It is easy to conclude that,
even in presence of high penetration ratios, worms injected in
the South area hardly find vehicles to carry them towards the
rest of the region.
The infection survivability in presence of different patient
zero locations and penetration ratios is depicted in Fig. 14(a),
Fig. 14(b), and Fig. 14(c). As already observed, higher pene-
tration ratios allow for a faster diffusion of the infection, an
effect that does not seem affected by the injection location.
Interestingly, the plots show that an infection starting at
the Center area is significantly faster than those starting at
the region borders. The difference lies in the first phases of
the infection. When the infection starts from the Center, the
infection ratio has a linear (or super-linear at high penetration
ratios) growth, while the curves for worms injected at the
region borders are very slow at first. More precisely, in the
North, West, South and East cases the infection ratio stays
close to zero up to a specific point, where the spreading
process seems to ignite and a linear (or super-linear at high
penetration ratios) growth, similar to that of the Center case,
begins. The precise moment at which such a transition occurs
varies for each injection area, and appears the earliest in the
West case and the latest in the South case. It is intuitive to
map the transition point to the instant when the worm reaches
the urban area of Zurich. Such a point corresponds to the
injection time for the Center area, while it depends on how
easily the worm can travel to the city center in the other cases:
e.g., the presence of a heavy-traffic highway clearly speeds up
infections originating in the West area.
6.3.2 Worm injection time
The road traffic has temporal variations, and it is typically
heavier at peak hours in the morning and in the afternoon.
This motivates a study of the impact of the injection time.
We thus fix the patient zero location within the Center area,
and vary the time at which the first infected vehicle appears.
Fig. 14(d) illustrates the resulting infection ratio over time,
under different penetration ratios. It can be observed that, no
matter the penetration ratio considered, the injection time does
not seem to have any significant effect on the overall infection
ratio achieved by the vehicular worm, nor on its survivability.
Instead, the injection time has a non-negligible impact on the
latency of the epidemics: a patient zero appearing during the
rush hours, e.g., at 3 pm, induces a faster infection, thanks to
the denser and thus better connected vehicular network that is
available at that moment of the day. Injecting the worm at the
same location, but during off-peak hours, results in a slower
propagation, consistently with the sparser car traffic observed
at those times.
6.4 Summary
Summarizing our findings, we conclude that a reasonably fast
worm can be extremely dangerous, independently of the carrier
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mechanisms it adopts, of the susceptible vehicle penetration,
or of the infection process origin. More precisely, we observed
that a worm that fits in a few IP packets, and that can thus be
transmitted over the wireless medium in less than one second
(accounting for channel contention and losses), can easily
infect a vast majority of the tens of thousands of vehicles
traveling in a very large region. Even worse, such infection
would occur in a time in the order of a few tens of minutes
at most, making it hard to counter the infection.
The physical reasons behind such an impressive perfor-
mance of the worm diffusion lie in (i) the elevate mobility
of nodes in the vehicular network, and (ii) the high number
of short-lived connections generated by the movement of
vehicles. Both these factors contribute in creating an ideal
environment for a fast worm to self-propagate. We also found
the geographical location of the infection origin to have a
dramatic effect on the reach and speed of the epidemics,
mainly due to the spatial heterogeneity of road traffic. The
temporal heterogeneity of road traffic is instead the cause
behind the different infection latencies observed when varying
the injection time of patient zero in the system.
7 EXPLOITING THE EPIDEMICS MODEL
In this section, we leverage the proposed model of a vehicular
worm epidemics in order to derive results that would be com-
putationally infeasible via network simulation. Specifically, in
Sec. 7.1 we use the model to perform a complete fine-grained
analysis of the level of danger associated to infections that
originate at each geographical location in the Canton of Zurich
scenario. Then, in Sec. 7.2, we exploit the model to design a
patching strategy aimed at taming vehicular worm epidemics.
7.1 Danger analysis of patient zero location
In Sec. 6.3, we discussed the relevance of the origin location to
the spread and rapidity of the infection process. However, that
analysis was limited to worms injected at random locations
within five broad regions, due to the cost of running more
extensive simulations of the epidemics.
The numerical model we presented in Sec. 5 lets us delve
much deeper in the study of the impact of patient zero’s
location. Specifically, the very low computational complexity
of the model allows us to estimate the evolution of the
vehicular worm epidemics when it originates on each of
the hundreds of roads present in the 10.000-km2 region of
the Canton of Zurich. We can thus draw a complete map
of the dangerousness of each geographical location as the
infection origin, in Fig. 15(a). There, we color each road
segment according to the spread delay that a worm injected
in that segment would require in order to infect 95% of the
susceptible vehicular population.
The map shows that the infection origins that are more
dangerous, i.e., yield lower spread delays, are those inside
the city of Zurich – a result consistent with the discussion
in Sec. 6.3. However, we have now a more comprehensive
view of the system, and we can observe how the spread
delay grows (and thus the epidemics become less rapid) as we
move away from the city center. Interestingly, the reduction is
not geographically uniform: we remark that, e.g., low-delay
regions stretch towards the West, and, to a lesser extent,
towards the South and North-East.
In order to clarify the reasons behind the geographical het-
erogeneity observed in the map, we investigate the correlation
between the spread delay associated to each road segment and
two sensible measures: (i) the distance of the segment from
the center of the city of Zurich, in Fig. 15(b), and the average
traffic density measured on the segment, in Fig. 15(c).
We remark a positive linear correlation between the distance
from Zurich and the spread delay in Fig. 15(b). However, there
is also significant variability in the numerical data around
the linear fitting, which confirms our obervation that the
distance from the city center alone cannot be the only physical
factor driving the level of danger associated to a geographical
location. In Fig. 15(c), the vehicular traffic is negatively
correlated to the spread delay, meaning that roads with more
intense traffic are more dangerous locations where to start
the infection. Moreover, we observe that such a negative
correlation is exponential, i.e., a minor growth in troad traffic
intensity tends to induce a significant decrease of the spread
delay. The reason is that heavily trafficked roads are typically
linked to each other, and build a well-connected vehicular
network backbone through which a worm can easily propagate.
Still, even in Fig. 15(c) the data is quite sparse around the
negative exponential fitting, and the density information alone
is again not sufficient to explain the map.
However, by considering the two measures at once, a bi-
dimensional fitting σ(∆, T ) = a + b∆c + deT is possible,
where σ is the spread delay, ∆ is the road segment distance
from the center of Zurich, T is its average traffic density,
and a, b, c, d, e are constants. Such a joint fitting with a =
10.3, b = 0.03, c = 1.4, d = 8.7, e = 1.05, depicted in
Fig.15(d), approximates the spread delay with a limited Root
Mean Square error of 2.19 minutes. This good result lets us
conclude that the dangerousness of a location can be well
characterized by jointly considering its distance from the city
center and its average traffic density.
7.2 Containing the worm epidemics
The results in Sec. 6 unveiled the dangerousness of vehicular
worms, which motivates the development of solutions for the
rapid containment of their outbreaks. Assuming the SIR with
Immunization model introduced in Sec. 3.3, the typical tech-
niques proposed in the literature are preemptive immunization
and interactive patching [20], [21]. In the first case, a subset
of the vehicles is preemptively immunized so as to prevent the
propagation of the worm. However, preemptive immunization
makes sense only in the case of static networks, where
immunized nodes can disrupt the connectivity exploitable by
the malware. In highly mobile environments, worms can easily
overcome the obstacle of preemptively immunized vehicles
thanks to car movements. In the case of interactive patching,
a patch to the worm is released in the network and diffused
through V2V communication in an epidemic fashion. In other
words, the patching follows a spreading process similar to that
of the worm itself. However, resorting to V2V communication
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Fig. 16. Smart cellular patching via the proposed model.
to contain the malware epidemics does not seem a sensible
choice, as it implies high delays and cannot guarantee the
complete removal of the threat.
We consider instead that cellular communication can be
leveraged to distribute the patch in a rapid and reliable
fashion. Indeed, vehicles already start to be equipped with
3G/4G radios, whose diffusion will anticipate that of V2V
communication interfaces. Therefore, that of a complete cel-
lular coverage of V2V-enabled vehicles seems a reasonable
assumption. The problem then becomes that of determining
which vehicles to patch. If a rough estimation of the area and
time at which the infection started is available, a smart cellular
patching can be adopted, limiting the immunization to vehicles
actually interested by the infection.
We thus propose a smart cellular-based patching based on
our data-driven model of the worm epidemics. Namely, the
model is exploited to determine the region within which the
worm may have spread since the estimated infection instant.
Then, only vehicles within such a region are immunized
through the cellular network. We remark that an equivalent
network simulation would take hours: given the rapidity of the
epidemics, the simulation result would be already outdated at
the time it becomes available.
Fig. 16 shows the results of the smart patching in the Canton
of Zurich, considering that the epidemics starts in the center of
Zurich at the peak traffic time. This is a worst-case scenario,
since it yields maximum network connectivity and thus ideal
conditions for the vehicular malware to self-propagate. The
response delay is the estimated time between the patient zero
appearance and the instant at which the smart patching is
run: clearly, longer response delays imply that the infection
has already reached larger portions of the road network when
countermeasures are taken. For each value of the response
delay (along the x axis) we report the number of vehicles
belonging to different and mutually exclusive categories: sus-
ceptible nodes were not infected and did not receive the
patch, recovered nodes were infected and later recovered upon
receiving the patch through the cellular network, immunized
nodes were not infected yet received the patch, and infected
nodes were infected but did not received the patch. Clearly,
the goal of a smart cellular-based patching is to recover all
infected nodes, leaving no infected vehicles and reducing the
number of unnecessarily immunized nodes to a minimum.
The results show that for a response time of 2 minutes,
the model correctly predicts the nodes to be patched, with
a negligible number of unnecessarily immunized vehicles.
As the response delay increases, the percentage of vehicles
infected by the malware grows, leading to the necessity of
patching a larger portion of the road traffic. Yet, our model
allows to successfully patch all infected vehicles, sparing up to
90% of transmissions with respect to an undiscerning patching,
and limiting the percentage of unnecessarily immunized nodes
to 20% in the worst case. More importantly, in all cases no
node remains infected after the smart patching, which proves
once more the quality of the model and its applicability to the
efficient containment of malware outbreaks.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We presented an extensive study of malware epidemics in
vehicular networks through V2V communication. Our simu-
lative analysis evidenced the high level of danger of vehicular
worms, capable of spreading through very large areas and
infect tens of thousands of vehicles in a tens of minutes at
most. We found that the high mobility of vehicular nodes
and the elevate number of short-lived V2V contacts they
generate are the key reason behind such a result. We then
presented a simple yet very effective data-driven model of
the worm propagation process, and leveraged it to show that
the level of danger associated to the worm injection position
can be ascribed to the distance of the location from the
urban center and to the local road traffic density. We also
employed the model as part of a solution for the containment
of the epidemics, based on smart patching of infected vehicles
through cellular communication.
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